A decomposition of strategy-proofness

Nozomu Muto, Shin Sato

    Abstract

    Strategy-proofness has been one of the central axioms in the theory of social choice. However, strategy-proofness often leads to impossibility results. We find that strategy-proofness is decomposed into three axioms: top-restricted AM-proofness, weak monotonicity, and individual bounded response. We present possibility results by dropping individual bounded response from strategy-proofness. One of the results supports the plurality rule which is one of the most widely used rules in practice.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1-18
    Number of pages18
    JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
    DOIs
    StateAccepted/In press - 2016 Apr 6

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    strategy
    individual
    theory
    practice

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

    Cite this

    A decomposition of strategy-proofness. / Muto, Nozomu; Sato, Shin.

    In: Social Choice and Welfare, 06.04.2016, p. 1-18.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Muto N, Sato S. A decomposition of strategy-proofness. Social Choice and Welfare. 2016 Apr 6;1-18. Available from, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0959-y

    Muto, Nozomu; Sato, Shin / A decomposition of strategy-proofness.

    In: Social Choice and Welfare, 06.04.2016, p. 1-18.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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